Is Bitcoin Mining Profitable? - The Balance

HydroMiner

Bitcoin mining with hydro power. Using hydro power stations in the Alps region, we reach one of the lowest prices per kilo Watt in Europe. In fact, our cost of electricity is currently 85% lower than the average in Europe.
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Hut 8 Mining Corp. Announces First Quarter 2018 Financial Results

Hut 8 Mining Corp. Announces First Quarter 2018 Financial Results
All Figures in Canadian Dollars Unless Otherwise Noted
Company raised $70.0 million to fund investment in mining hardware Entered into definitive agreement with the City of Medicine Hat for the supply of 42 MW of electric energy First quarter 2018 revenue of $10,988,949 Strong gross profit margin of 80%, or $8,823,650 (excluding depreciation) Adjusted EBITDA of $7,690,365 828 Bitcoin mined in Q1
TORONTO, May 24, 2018 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Hut 8 Mining Corp. (TSX-V:HUT) (“Hut 8”, or the “Company”), a cryptocurrency mining and blockchain infrastructure company established through an exclusive arrangement with the world’s leading full-service blockchain technology company, the Bitfury Group, is pleased to announce its financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2018 (“Q1 2018”). Hut 8 owns Bitcoin mining datacenters called BlockBoxes that are purchased from the Bitfury Group.
Corporate Update
Andrew Kiguel, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hut 8, said: “We are pleased with the progress Hut 8 has made in a very short period of time. Hut 8 began mining on December 22, 2017 with 7 BlockBoxes in Drumheller, Alberta, with power capacity of 7.7 MW, representing 52.5 PH/s. On February 7, 2018, an additional 10 BlockBoxes were added in Drumheller for an aggregate power capacity of 18.7 MW, representing 128 PH/s. Despite the ramp-up period, in Q1 2018 Hut 8 was able to mine a total of 828 Bitcoin. As of May 24, 2018, Hut 8 has mined in excess of 1,300 Bitcoin which we continue to hold.”
“We are excited that our data center build-out in the City of Medicine Hat is well underway. We estimate that full-scale production will commence by September 2018. The City of Medicine Hat site will consist of an additional 40 BlockBoxes. Once operational, Hut 8 will own 57 BlockBoxes, representing a 335% increase from current mining capacity, securing our position as one of the largest publicly traded Bitcoin miners in the world, with a total of 66.7 MW of power capacity and 448 PH/s. With this increase in BlockBoxes from 17 to 57, we expect that our daily mining production will increase significantly. We believe our City of Medicine Hat Facility will represent operational excellence and set a new global benchmark for industrial scale cryptocurrency mining operations,” added Kiguel.
Manufactured by the Bitfury Group, the BlockBoxes are regarded as one of the most powerful and cost-effective Bitcoin mining solutions available on the market. The BlockBoxes are based on cutting-edge hardware and software and are fully configurable and upgradeable to the next generation of silicon technology. The efficient design and low operating cost of the BlockBoxes makes Bitcoin mining more productive and affordable. As previously disclosed, Hut 8 has obtained an exclusive right to all Bitfury Group hardware and software solutions, including the BlockBoxes, for cryptocurrency mining within North America.
Q1 2018 Financial Results
Q1 2018 represented Hut 8’s first full quarter in operations. With a gross profit margin of 80% (excluding depreciation), the Company’s mining cost-per-bitcoin was $2,615 (US$2,028), which compares favorably to the selling price of Bitcoin at the end of Q1 2018, being $8,991.67 (US$6,973.53).
The Company believes that Hut 8 is amongst the lowest cost miners of Bitcoin in the world. Hut 8 anticipates its cost per Bitcoin to remain competitive, based on the increasing difficulty rate, offset by the City of Medicine Hat site that will operate more efficiently, next generation BlockBoxes, and a benefit from an improved energy contract for the price of electricity over the Drumheller site.
Selected Financial Highlights from Q1 2018
Revenues of $10,988,949 Gross profit of $8,823,650 (excluding depreciation) EBITDA1 of $1,824,685 and Adjusted EBITDA1 of $7,690,365 Completion of the Company’s “Qualifying Transaction” Raised $70.0 million of equity capital to fund investments and growth Cash balance of $23.7 million and working capital of $19.3 million Mined 828 Bitcoin in Q1 2018, bringing total mined since commencing operations on December 21, 2017 to over 1,300 On February 7, 2018, added 10 new operating BlockBox Data Centers for a total of 17 in operation, representing 18.7 MW / 128 PH/s Purchased 40 additional BlockBoxes to be operational by Q3 2018 representing additional 48 MW / 320 PH/s Entered into definitive agreements with the city of Medicine Hat for the supply of 42 MW of electric energy and the lease of land
Summary of Q1 2018 Financial Results Revenue $ 10,988,949 Gross Profit $ 3,183,181 Gross Profit % 29% Gross Profit (excluding depreciation) $ 8,823,650 Gross Profit % (excluding depreciation) 80% Operating income $ 218,701 Net Loss $ (3,815,784 ) EBITDA $ 1,824,685 Adjusted EBITDA* $ 7,690,365 Loss per share $ (0.05 ) * EBITDA adjusted for fair value re-measurement of digital assets, listing expense and one time transactional costs.
As a result of the decrease in the price of Bitcoin in Q1 2018, Hut 8 incurred a $4.1 million non-cash decrease on the re-measurement of the value of Bitcoin in inventory, and consequently, finished the quarter with a net loss of approximately $3.8 million. In future quarters, when revenue is recorded, the Company would expect to see unrealized gains or losses based on the price of Bitcoin on the corresponding reporting date, relative to the price on the day mined.
This earnings release should be read in conjunction with the Company's Management Discussion & Analysis, Financial Statements and Notes to Financial Statements for Q1 2018, which have been posted under the Company’s profile on SEDAR at www.sedar.com and are also available on the Company's website at www.hut8mining.com.
ABOUT HUT 8 MINING CORP.
Hut 8 Mining Corp., headquartered in Toronto, Canada is a cryptocurrency mining and blockchain infrastructure company established through an exclusive arrangement with the Bitfury Group, the world’s leading full-service blockchain technology company. Through the Bitfury Group, Hut 8 has access to a world-leading proprietary mix of hardware, software and operational expertise to construct, optimize and manage datacenters in low-cost and attractive jurisdictions. Hut 8 is led by a team of industry experts and intends to provide investors with exposure to blockchain processing infrastructure and technology along with underlying cryptocurrency rewards and transaction fees.
Hut 8 provides investors with direct exposure to bitcoin, without the technical complexity or constraints of purchasing the underlying cryptocurrency. Investors avoid the need to create online wallets, wire money offshore and safely store their bitcoins. Hut 8 provides a secure and simple way to invest. For more information, visit www.hut8mining.com.
Key investment highlights and FAQ’s: https://www.hut8mining.com/investors.
Keep up-to-date on Hut 8 events and developments and join our online communities at Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.
Hut 8 Media Contact:
Talk Shop Media Natalie Davidson Email: [email protected] Tel: (604) 215-2749
Hut 8 Corporate Contact:
Andrew Kiguel President and Chief Executive Officer Email: [email protected]
FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS
Certain information in this press release constitutes forward-looking information. In some cases, but not necessarily in all cases, forward-looking information can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “plans”, “targets”, “expects” or “does not expect”, “is expected”, “an opportunity exists”, “is positioned”, “estimates”, “intends”, “assumes”, “anticipates” or “does not anticipate” or “believes”, or variations of such words and phrases or state that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might”, “will” or “will be taken”, “occur” or “be achieved”. In addition, any statements that refer to expectations, projections or other characterizations of future events or circumstances contain forward-looking information. Statements containing forward-looking information are not historical facts but instead represent management’s expectations, estimates and projections regarding future events.
Forward-looking information is necessarily based on a number of opinions, assumptions and estimates that, while considered reasonable by Hut 8 as of the date of this press release, are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking information, including but not limited to the factors described in greater detail in the “Risk Factors” section of the Filing Statement relating to the Qualifying Transaction of Oriana Resources Corporation and Hut 8, which is available at www.sedar.com. These factors are not intended to represent a complete list of the factors that could affect Hut 8; however, these factors should be considered carefully. There can be no assurance that such estimates and assumptions will prove to be correct. The forward-looking statements contained in this press release are made as of the date of this press release, and Hut 8 expressly disclaims any obligation to update or alter statements containing any forward-looking information, or the factors or assumptions underlying them, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law. Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.
1 EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP measures and consequently, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for net income and loss presented in accordance with GAAP. The Company uses Adjusted EBITDA as a non-GAAP financial performance measurement. The Company calculates Adjusted EBITDA by adding back to net income (loss): interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization expense, and impairment charges as further adjusted to add back stock-based compensation expense and non-recurring items. Adjusted EBITDA is provided to investors to supplement the results of operations reported in accordance with GAAP. Management believes that Adjusted EBITDA provides an additional tool for investors to use in comparing the Company’s financial results with other companies in the industry, many of which also use Adjusted EBITDA in their communications to investors. By excluding non-cash charges such as amortization, depreciation, stock-based compensation and impairment charges, as well as non-operating charges for interest and income taxes, investors can evaluate the Company's operations and its ability to generate cash flows from operations and can compare its results on a more consistent basis to the results of other companies in the industry. Management also uses Adjusted EBITDA to establish internal budgets and goals, and evaluate performance of its business units and management, and evaluate potential acquisitions. The Company considers Adjusted EBITDA to be an important indicator of the Company's operational strength and performance of its business and a useful measure of the Company's historical and prospective operating trends. However, there are significant limitations to the use of Adjusted EBITDA since it excludes interest income and expense and income taxes and non-recurring items such as goodwill impairments, each of which impact the Company's profitability and operating cash flows, as well as depreciation, amortization, impairment charges and stock-based compensation. The Company believes that these limitations are compensated by clearly identifying the difference between the two measures. Adjusted EBITDA as defined by the Company may not be comparable with similarly named measures provided by other entities.
submitted by Fiach_Dubh to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Hut 8 Mining Corp. Announces First Quarter 2018 Financial Results

Back , Hut 8 Mining Corp. Announces First Quarter 2018 Financial Results
All Figures in Canadian Dollars Unless Otherwise Noted
Company raised $70.0 million to fund investment in mining hardware Entered into definitive agreement with the City of Medicine Hat for the supply of 42 MW of electric energy First quarter 2018 revenue of $10,988,949 Strong gross profit margin of 80%, or $8,823,650 (excluding depreciation) Adjusted EBITDA of $7,690,365 828 Bitcoin mined in Q1
TORONTO, May 24, 2018 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Hut 8 Mining Corp. (TSX-V:HUT) (“Hut 8”, or the “Company”), a cryptocurrency mining and blockchain infrastructure company established through an exclusive arrangement with the world’s leading full-service blockchain technology company, the Bitfury Group, is pleased to announce its financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2018 (“Q1 2018”). Hut 8 owns Bitcoin mining datacenters called BlockBoxes that are purchased from the Bitfury Group.
Corporate Update
Andrew Kiguel, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hut 8, said: “We are pleased with the progress Hut 8 has made in a very short period of time. Hut 8 began mining on December 22, 2017 with 7 BlockBoxes in Drumheller, Alberta, with power capacity of 7.7 MW, representing 52.5 PH/s. On February 7, 2018, an additional 10 BlockBoxes were added in Drumheller for an aggregate power capacity of 18.7 MW, representing 128 PH/s. Despite the ramp-up period, in Q1 2018 Hut 8 was able to mine a total of 828 Bitcoin. As of May 24, 2018, Hut 8 has mined in excess of 1,300 Bitcoin which we continue to hold.”
“We are excited that our data center build-out in the City of Medicine Hat is well underway. We estimate that full-scale production will commence by September 2018. The City of Medicine Hat site will consist of an additional 40 BlockBoxes. Once operational, Hut 8 will own 57 BlockBoxes, representing a 335% increase from current mining capacity, securing our position as one of the largest publicly traded Bitcoin miners in the world, with a total of 66.7 MW of power capacity and 448 PH/s. With this increase in BlockBoxes from 17 to 57, we expect that our daily mining production will increase significantly. We believe our City of Medicine Hat Facility will represent operational excellence and set a new global benchmark for industrial scale cryptocurrency mining operations,” added Kiguel.
Manufactured by the Bitfury Group, the BlockBoxes are regarded as one of the most powerful and cost-effective Bitcoin mining solutions available on the market. The BlockBoxes are based on cutting-edge hardware and software and are fully configurable and upgradeable to the next generation of silicon technology. The efficient design and low operating cost of the BlockBoxes makes Bitcoin mining more productive and affordable. As previously disclosed, Hut 8 has obtained an exclusive right to all Bitfury Group hardware and software solutions, including the BlockBoxes, for cryptocurrency mining within North America.
Q1 2018 Financial Results
Q1 2018 represented Hut 8’s first full quarter in operations. With a gross profit margin of 80% (excluding depreciation), the Company’s mining cost-per-bitcoin was $2,615 (US$2,028), which compares favorably to the selling price of Bitcoin at the end of Q1 2018, being $8,991.67 (US$6,973.53).
The Company believes that Hut 8 is amongst the lowest cost miners of Bitcoin in the world. Hut 8 anticipates its cost per Bitcoin to remain competitive, based on the increasing difficulty rate, offset by the City of Medicine Hat site that will operate more efficiently, next generation BlockBoxes, and a benefit from an improved energy contract for the price of electricity over the Drumheller site.
Selected Financial Highlights from Q1 2018
Revenues of $10,988,949 Gross profit of $8,823,650 (excluding depreciation) EBITDA1 of $1,824,685 and Adjusted EBITDA1 of $7,690,365 Completion of the Company’s “Qualifying Transaction” Raised $70.0 million of equity capital to fund investments and growth Cash balance of $23.7 million and working capital of $19.3 million Mined 828 Bitcoin in Q1 2018, bringing total mined since commencing operations on December 21, 2017 to over 1,300 On February 7, 2018, added 10 new operating BlockBox Data Centers for a total of 17 in operation, representing 18.7 MW / 128 PH/s Purchased 40 additional BlockBoxes to be operational by Q3 2018 representing additional 48 MW / 320 PH/s Entered into definitive agreements with the city of Medicine Hat for the supply of 42 MW of electric energy and the lease of land
Summary of Q1 2018 Financial Results Revenue $ 10,988,949 Gross Profit $ 3,183,181 Gross Profit % 29% Gross Profit (excluding depreciation) $ 8,823,650 Gross Profit % (excluding depreciation) 80% Operating income $ 218,701 Net Loss $ (3,815,784 ) EBITDA $ 1,824,685 Adjusted EBITDA* $ 7,690,365 Loss per share $ (0.05 ) * EBITDA adjusted for fair value re-measurement of digital assets, listing expense and one time transactional costs.
As a result of the decrease in the price of Bitcoin in Q1 2018, Hut 8 incurred a $4.1 million non-cash decrease on the re-measurement of the value of Bitcoin in inventory, and consequently, finished the quarter with a net loss of approximately $3.8 million. In future quarters, when revenue is recorded, the Company would expect to see unrealized gains or losses based on the price of Bitcoin on the corresponding reporting date, relative to the price on the day mined.
This earnings release should be read in conjunction with the Company's Management Discussion & Analysis, Financial Statements and Notes to Financial Statements for Q1 2018, which have been posted under the Company’s profile on SEDAR at www.sedar.com and are also available on the Company's website at www.hut8mining.com.
ABOUT HUT 8 MINING CORP.
Hut 8 Mining Corp., headquartered in Toronto, Canada is a cryptocurrency mining and blockchain infrastructure company established through an exclusive arrangement with the Bitfury Group, the world’s leading full-service blockchain technology company. Through the Bitfury Group, Hut 8 has access to a world-leading proprietary mix of hardware, software and operational expertise to construct, optimize and manage datacenters in low-cost and attractive jurisdictions. Hut 8 is led by a team of industry experts and intends to provide investors with exposure to blockchain processing infrastructure and technology along with underlying cryptocurrency rewards and transaction fees.
Hut 8 provides investors with direct exposure to bitcoin, without the technical complexity or constraints of purchasing the underlying cryptocurrency. Investors avoid the need to create online wallets, wire money offshore and safely store their bitcoins. Hut 8 provides a secure and simple way to invest. For more information, visit www.hut8mining.com.
Key investment highlights and FAQ’s: https://www.hut8mining.com/investors.
Keep up-to-date on Hut 8 events and developments and join our online communities at Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.
Hut 8 Media Contact:
Talk Shop Media Natalie Davidson Email: [email protected] Tel: (604) 215-2749
Hut 8 Corporate Contact:
Andrew Kiguel President and Chief Executive Officer Email: [email protected]
FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS
Certain information in this press release constitutes forward-looking information. In some cases, but not necessarily in all cases, forward-looking information can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “plans”, “targets”, “expects” or “does not expect”, “is expected”, “an opportunity exists”, “is positioned”, “estimates”, “intends”, “assumes”, “anticipates” or “does not anticipate” or “believes”, or variations of such words and phrases or state that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might”, “will” or “will be taken”, “occur” or “be achieved”. In addition, any statements that refer to expectations, projections or other characterizations of future events or circumstances contain forward-looking information. Statements containing forward-looking information are not historical facts but instead represent management’s expectations, estimates and projections regarding future events.
Forward-looking information is necessarily based on a number of opinions, assumptions and estimates that, while considered reasonable by Hut 8 as of the date of this press release, are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking information, including but not limited to the factors described in greater detail in the “Risk Factors” section of the Filing Statement relating to the Qualifying Transaction of Oriana Resources Corporation and Hut 8, which is available at www.sedar.com. These factors are not intended to represent a complete list of the factors that could affect Hut 8; however, these factors should be considered carefully. There can be no assurance that such estimates and assumptions will prove to be correct. The forward-looking statements contained in this press release are made as of the date of this press release, and Hut 8 expressly disclaims any obligation to update or alter statements containing any forward-looking information, or the factors or assumptions underlying them, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law. Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.
1 EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP measures and consequently, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for net income and loss presented in accordance with GAAP. The Company uses Adjusted EBITDA as a non-GAAP financial performance measurement. The Company calculates Adjusted EBITDA by adding back to net income (loss): interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization expense, and impairment charges as further adjusted to add back stock-based compensation expense and non-recurring items. Adjusted EBITDA is provided to investors to supplement the results of operations reported in accordance with GAAP. Management believes that Adjusted EBITDA provides an additional tool for investors to use in comparing the Company’s financial results with other companies in the industry, many of which also use Adjusted EBITDA in their communications to investors. By excluding non-cash charges such as amortization, depreciation, stock-based compensation and impairment charges, as well as non-operating charges for interest and income taxes, investors can evaluate the Company's operations and its ability to generate cash flows from operations and can compare its results on a more consistent basis to the results of other companies in the industry. Management also uses Adjusted EBITDA to establish internal budgets and goals, and evaluate performance of its business units and management, and evaluate potential acquisitions. The Company considers Adjusted EBITDA to be an important indicator of the Company's operational strength and performance of its business and a useful measure of the Company's historical and prospective operating trends. However, there are significant limitations to the use of Adjusted EBITDA since it excludes interest income and expense and income taxes and non-recurring items such as goodwill impairments, each of which impact the Company's profitability and operating cash flows, as well as depreciation, amortization, impairment charges and stock-based compensation. The Company believes that these limitations are compensated by clearly identifying the difference between the two measures. Adjusted EBITDA as defined by the Company may not be comparable with similarly named measures provided by other entities.
submitted by Fiach_Dubh to BitcoinCA [link] [comments]

Two Months to Bitcoin Halving – Analyst Shuns FUD around Effect on Mining Cost

Two Months to Bitcoin Halving – Analyst Shuns FUD around Effect on Mining Cost submitted by n4bb to CoinPath [link] [comments]

Is it cost effective to mine bitcoins using Amazon's EC2?

I don't own a computer that can handle the processing required but I also don't quite understand the cost structure of EC2 or what goes into mining well enough either. Any help would be appreciated!
submitted by Nblearchangel to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Cryptonomos and Giga Watt Launch WTT Token to Make Cost-Effective Mining Available to Everyone - Crypto Insider - Bitcoin and Blockchain News • r/BitcoinMining

Cryptonomos and Giga Watt Launch WTT Token to Make Cost-Effective Mining Available to Everyone - Crypto Insider - Bitcoin and Blockchain News • BitcoinMining submitted by WTTToken to BitcoinMining [link] [comments]

Cryptonomos and Giga Watt Launch WTT Token to Make Cost-Effective Mining Available to Everyone - Crypto Insider - Bitcoin and Blockchain News

Cryptonomos and Giga Watt Launch WTT Token to Make Cost-Effective Mining Available to Everyone - Crypto Insider - Bitcoin and Blockchain News submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Cryptonomos and Giga Watt Launch WTT Token to Make Cost-Effective Mining Available to Everyone - Crypto Insider - Bitcoin and Blockchain News r/BitcoinMining

Cryptonomos and Giga Watt Launch WTT Token to Make Cost-Effective Mining Available to Everyone - Crypto Insider - Bitcoin and Blockchain News BitcoinMining submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Has anyone used Amazon EC2 for bitcoin mining? Is it cost effective?

Has anyone used Amazon EC2 for bitcoin mining? Is it cost effective? submitted by rae1988 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

If the bitcoin price were to drop to $2000 again, would it become more cost effective to mine? Or would it still not be worth the time/money/effort /r/Bitcoin

If the bitcoin price were to drop to $2000 again, would it become more cost effective to mine? Or would it still not be worth the time/money/effort /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

"Nowadays, however, few would propose a return to the actual use of simply the metal gold as a standard, for the following reasons. (i) The cost of mining gold effectively does depend on the technology...the unpredictability of the cost is a negative factor." /r/Bitcoin

submitted by coincrazyy to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

A New Cost Effective Way To Mine Bitcoins - Open Bath Immersion

A New Cost Effective Way To Mine Bitcoins - Open Bath Immersion submitted by africanos23 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

A theory of why Ethereum is perhaps better "sound money" than Bitcoin.

The idea of Bitcoin's supremacy as "sound money" is very frequently thrown around by the biggest talking heads in the crypto world. I know I will get a lot of hate for suggesting that this theory is not only flawed, but it is straight up wrong. As unintuitive as it may sound to Bitcoin maximalists (no offense intended) I believe Ethereum is on the path to becoming the global leading asset and model for sound money... give me a chance to explain why.

  1. The idea that nothing can change Bitcoin's issuance schedule is a myth. There is absolutely no divine power controlling the supply of Bitcoin. Contrary to what is commonly asserted, Bitcoin's issuance protocol is not primarily driven by what is currently implemented. The real driver is consensus: the majority of network participants must agree that what is currently defined cannot be changed. There is an underlying assumption that the consensus would never want to change Bitcoin's issuance. On the surface this makes for a nice "sound money" narrative, but it is false premise and sticking to it could be ultimately detrimental. It presents a long term sustainability issue (the hope that somehow Bitcoin's base layer will scale enough to maintain security entirely through fees). It also completely dismisses the possibility that an unforeseen event could create pressure to change the issuance. If Bitcoin managed to create a consensus mechanism that did not rely on mining, it is very likely there would be consensus to reduce issuance. On the other hand, if some potentially catastrophic event would create incentives to increase the issuance, it would only make sense for the network to do so.
  2. Issuance flexibility is not fundamentally bad. Etheruem's approach to adjust the issuance according to the contextual circumstances has resulted in a faster rate of issuance reduction than what was originally defined in the protocol. The rate of issuance will continue to decrease as new developments allow for it to happen without compromising the network security. There is a very high probability that Ethereum will achieve a lower issuance rate than Bitcoin in the next two years, and it could possibly achieve zero issuance in the next five years. This would be a result of a successful implementation of PoS, sharding and EIP-1559.
  3. The root of all evil is Proof of Work. PoW is by far the primary cost of operating the Bitcoin network. It is the primary determinant of how much issuance is needed as a financial incentive to keep miners doing their thing. The very mechanism that secures the network's decentralization is unfortunately quite wasteful. The degree of decentralization is a direct result of how much random mathematical operations are being done by miners.
  4. There is a better way. Some people will take offense by the use of the word wasteful, and they claim that it is not because those mindless calculations are what is actually securing the network. However, its wasteful aspect becomes clear if there is a different way to achieve equal or superior decentralization without the need to crunch difficult computational problems. This just so happens to be embodied in Ethereum's design of Proof of Stake. It will drastically reduce the cost of securing the network, while providing at least 2-3% annual returns for the ownership of Ether. When Ethereum's issuance becomes lower than its staking rewards, it will effectively have achieved the same effect as having zero (or possibly negative) issuance.
  5. The value proposition of Ethereum 2.0 is unmatched. There is just absolutely no asset in the world that has a 2-3% self-denominated annual returns and just so happens to be rapidly appreciating. When wall-street's greed sees this, it will create the mother of all bubbles.
  6. Don't dismiss the flippening. On February 01 2018 Ethereum reached 70% of Bitcoin's marked cap (it was even closer if you account for the amount of lost bitcoins). That happened before DEFI, before proof of staking was within reach, before multiple effective layer 2 solutions were a thing, before wrapped Bitcoins and before the first signs of mass adoption were on the horizon (like integration with Reddit , VISA and potential to compete with SWIFT). Utility is a huge factor in driving prices, lets not forget how Silk Road played a key role into propelling Bitcoin's value. Yes, Ethereum crashed hard after the peak in 2018, but perhaps it is simply manifesting a higher volatility pattern that is reminiscent of Bitcoin's early years. Bitcoin's first 5 years were characterized by aggressive price swings, why should it be different for Etheruem (considering it is about 5 years younger than Bitcoin)? If the volatility patterns stands on this bull market, we will see a flippening.
So... do I think Etheruem will flip? Yes I do, but I still hold Bitcoin. No one has a crystal ball, and nothing is certain. Perhaps Etheruem will crash and burn, perhaps Bitcoin will become the next Yahoo, and perhaps they will both thrive in this new exciting crypto world.
submitted by TheWierdGuy to ethereum [link] [comments]

Since they're calling for r/btc to be banned...

Maybe it's time to discuss bitcoin's history again. Credit to u/singularity87 for the original post over 3 years ago.

People should get the full story of bitcoin because it is probably one of the strangest of all reddit subs.
bitcoin, the main sub for the bitcoin community is held and run by a person who goes by the pseudonym u/theymos. Theymos not only controls bitcoin, but also bitcoin.org and bitcointalk.com. These are top three communication channels for the bitcoin community, all controlled by just one person.
For most of bitcoin's history this did not create a problem (at least not an obvious one anyway) until around mid 2015. This happened to be around the time a new player appeared on the scene, a for-profit company called Blockstream. Blockstream was made up of/hired many (but not all) of the main bitcoin developers. (To be clear, Blockstream was founded before mid 2015 but did not become publicly active until then). A lot of people, including myself, tried to point out there we're some very serious potential conflicts of interest that could arise when one single company controls most of the main developers for the biggest decentralised and distributed cryptocurrency. There were a lot of unknowns but people seemed to give them the benefit of the doubt because they were apparently about to release some new software called "sidechains" that could offer some benefits to the network.
Not long after Blockstream came on the scene the issue of bitcoin's scalability once again came to forefront of the community. This issue came within the community a number of times since bitcoins inception. Bitcoin, as dictated in the code, cannot handle any more than around 3 transactions per second at the moment. To put that in perspective Paypal handles around 15 transactions per second on average and VISA handles something like 2000 transactions per second. The discussion in the community has been around how best to allow bitcoin to scale to allow a higher number of transactions in a given amount of time. I suggest that if anyone is interested in learning more about this problem from a technical angle, they go to btc and do a search. It's a complex issue but for many who have followed bitcoin for many years, the possible solutions seem relatively obvious. Essentially, currently the limit is put in place in just a few lines of code. This was not originally present when bitcoin was first released. It was in fact put in place afterwards as a measure to stop a bloating attack on the network. Because all bitcoin transactions have to be stored forever on the bitcoin network, someone could theoretically simply transmit a large number of transactions which would have to be stored by the entire network forever. When bitcoin was released, transactions were actually for free as the only people running the network were enthusiasts. In fact a single bitcoin did not even have any specific value so it would be impossible set a fee value. This meant that a malicious person could make the size of the bitcoin ledger grow very rapidly without much/any cost which would stop people from wanting to join the network due to the resource requirements needed to store it, which at the time would have been for very little gain.
Towards the end of the summer last year, this bitcoin scaling debate surfaced again as it was becoming clear that the transaction limit for bitcoin was semi regularly being reached and that it would not be long until it would be regularly hit and the network would become congested. This was a very serious issue for a currency. Bitcoin had made progress over the years to the point of retailers starting to offer it as a payment option. Bitcoin companies like, Microsoft, Paypal, Steam and many more had began to adopt it. If the transaction limit would be constantly maxed out, the network would become unreliable and slow for users. Users and businesses would not be able to make a reliable estimate when their transaction would be confirmed by the network.
Users, developers and businesses (which at the time was pretty much the only real bitcoin subreddit) started to discuss how we should solve the problem bitcoin. There was significant support from the users and businesses behind a simple solution put forward by the developer Gavin Andreesen. Gavin was the lead developer after Satoshi Nakamoto left bitcoin and he left it in his hands. Gavin initially proposed a very simple solution of increasing the limit which was to change the few lines of code to increase the maximum number of transactions that are allowed. For most of bitcoin's history the transaction limit had been set far far higher than the number of transactions that could potentially happen on the network. The concept of increasing the limit one time was based on the fact that history had proven that no issue had been cause by this in the past.
A certain group of bitcoin developers decided that increasing the limit by this amount was too much and that it was dangerous. They said that the increased use of resources that the network would use would create centralisation pressures which could destroy the network. The theory was that a miner of the network with more resources could publish many more transactions than a competing small miner could handle and therefore the network would tend towards few large miners rather than many small miners. The group of developers who supported this theory were all developers who worked for the company Blockstream. The argument from people in support of increasing the transaction capacity by this amount was that there are always inherent centralisation pressure with bitcoin mining. For example miners who can access the cheapest electricity will tend to succeed and that bigger miners will be able to find this cheaper electricity easier. Miners who have access to the most efficient computer chips will tend to succeed and that larger miners are more likely to be able to afford the development of them. The argument from Gavin and other who supported increasing the transaction capacity by this method are essentially there are economies of scale in mining and that these economies have far bigger centralisation pressures than increased resource cost for a larger number of transactions (up to the new limit proposed). For example, at the time the total size of the blockchain was around 50GB. Even for the cost of a 500GB SSD is only $150 and would last a number of years. This is in-comparison to the $100,000's in revenue per day a miner would be making.
Various developers put forth various other proposals, including Gavin Andresen who put forth a more conservative increase that would then continue to increase over time inline with technological improvements. Some of the employees of blockstream also put forth some proposals, but all were so conservative, it would take bitcoin many decades before it could reach a scale of VISA. Even though there was significant support from the community behind Gavin's simple proposal of increasing the limit it was becoming clear certain members of the bitcoin community who were part of Blockstream were starting to become increasingly vitriolic and divisive. Gavin then teamed up with one of the other main bitcoin developers Mike Hearn and released a coded (i.e. working) version of the bitcoin software that would only activate if it was supported by a significant majority of the network. What happened next was where things really started to get weird.
After this free and open source software was released, Theymos, the person who controls all the main communication channels for the bitcoin community implemented a new moderation policy that disallowed any discussion of this new software. Specifically, if people were to discuss this software, their comments would be deleted and ultimately they would be banned temporarily or permanently. This caused chaos within the community as there was very clear support for this software at the time and it seemed our best hope for finally solving the problem and moving on. Instead a censorship campaign was started. At first it 'all' they were doing was banning and removing discussions but after a while it turned into actively manipulating the discussion. For example, if a thread was created where there was positive sentiment for increasing the transaction capacity or being negative about the moderation policies or negative about the actions of certain bitcoin developers, the mods of bitcoin would selectively change the sorting order of threads to 'controversial' so that the most support opinions would be sorted to the bottom of the thread and the most vitriolic would be sorted to the top of the thread. This was initially very transparent as it was possible to see that the most downvoted comments were at the top and some of the most upvoted were at the bottom. So they then implemented hiding the voting scores next to the users name. This made impossible to work out the sentiment of the community and when combined with selectively setting the sorting order to controversial it was possible control what information users were seeing. Also, due to the very very large number of removed comments and users it was becoming obvious the scale of censorship going on. To hide this they implemented code in their CSS for the sub that completely hid comments that they had removed so that the censorship itself was hidden. Anyone in support of scaling bitcoin were removed from the main communication channels. Theymos even proudly announced that he didn't care if he had to remove 90% of the users. He also later acknowledged that he knew he had the ability to block support of this software using the control he had over the communication channels.
While this was all going on, Blockstream and it's employees started lobbying the community by paying for conferences about scaling bitcoin, but with the very very strange rule that no decisions could be made and no complete solutions could be proposed. These conferences were likely strategically (and successfully) created to stunt support for the scaling software Gavin and Mike had released by forcing the community to take a "lets wait and see what comes from the conferences" kind of approach. Since no final solutions were allowed at these conferences, they only served to hinder and splinter the communities efforts to find a solution. As the software Gavin and Mike released called BitcoinXT gained support it started to be attacked. Users of the software were attack by DDOS. Employees of Blockstream were recommending attacks against the software, such as faking support for it, to only then drop support at the last moment to put the network in disarray. Blockstream employees were also publicly talking about suing Gavin and Mike from various different angles simply for releasing this open source software that no one was forced to run. In the end Mike Hearn decided to leave due to the way many members of the bitcoin community had treated him. This was due to the massive disinformation campaign against him on bitcoin. One of the many tactics that are used against anyone who does not support Blockstream and the bitcoin developers who work for them is that you will be targeted in a smear campaign. This has happened to a number of individuals and companies who showed support for scaling bitcoin. Theymos has threatened companies that he will ban any discussion of them on the communication channels he controls (i.e. all the main ones) for simply running software that he disagrees with (i.e. any software that scales bitcoin).
As time passed, more and more proposals were offered, all against the backdrop of ever increasing censorship in the main bitcoin communication channels. It finally come down the smallest and most conservative solution. This solution was much smaller than even the employees of Blockstream had proposed months earlier. As usual there was enormous attacks from all sides and the most vocal opponents were the employees of Blockstream. These attacks still are ongoing today. As this software started to gain support, Blockstream organised more meetings, especially with the biggest bitcoin miners and made a pact with them. They promised that they would release code that would offer an on-chain scaling solution hardfork within about 4 months, but if the miners wanted this they would have to commit to running their software and only their software. The miners agreed and the ended up not running the most conservative proposal possible. This was in February last year. There is no hardfork proposal in sight from the people who agreed to this pact and bitcoin is still stuck with the exact same transaction limit it has had since the limit was put in place about 6 years ago. Gavin has also been publicly smeared by the developers at Blockstream and a plot was made against him to have him removed from the development team. Gavin has now been, for all intents an purposes, expelled from bitcoin development. This has meant that all control of bitcoin development is in the hands of the developers working at Blockstream.
There is a new proposal that offers a market based approach to scaling bitcoin. This essentially lets the market decide. Of course, as usual there has been attacks against it, and verbal attacks from the employees of Blockstream. This has the biggest chance of gaining wide support and solving the problem for good.
To give you an idea of Blockstream; It has hired most of the main and active bitcoin developers and is now synonymous with the "Core" bitcoin development team. They AFAIK no products at all. They have received around $75m in funding. Every single thing they do is supported by theymos. They have started implementing an entirely new economic system for bitcoin against the will of it's users and have blocked any and all attempts to scaling the network in line with the original vision.
Although this comment is ridiculously long, it really only covers the tip of the iceberg. You could write a book on the last two years of bitcoin. The things that have been going on have been mind blowing. One last thing that I think is worth talking about is the u/bashco's claim of vote manipulation.
The users that the video talks about have very very large numbers of downvotes mostly due to them having a very very high chance of being astroturfers. Around about the same time last year when Blockstream came active on the scene every single bitcoin troll disappeared, and I mean literally every single one. In the years before that there were a large number of active anti-bitcoin trolls. They even have an active sub buttcoin. Up until last year you could go down to the bottom of pretty much any thread in bitcoin and see many of the usual trolls who were heavily downvoted for saying something along the lines of "bitcoin is shit", "You guys and your tulips" etc. But suddenly last year they all disappeared. Instead a new type of bitcoin user appeared. Someone who said they were fully in support of bitcoin but they just so happened to support every single thing Blockstream and its employees said and did. They had the exact same tone as the trolls who had disappeared. Their way to talking to people was aggressive, they'd call people names, they had a relatively poor understanding of how bitcoin fundamentally worked. They were extremely argumentative. These users are the majority of the list of that video. When the 10's of thousands of users were censored and expelled from bitcoin they ended up congregating in btc. The strange thing was that the users listed in that video also moved over to btc and spend all day everyday posting troll-like comments and misinformation. Naturally they get heavily downvoted by the real users in btc. They spend their time constantly causing as much drama as possible. At every opportunity they scream about "censorship" in btc while they are happy about the censorship in bitcoin. These people are astroturfers. What someone somewhere worked out, is that all you have to do to take down a community is say that you are on their side. It is an astoundingly effective form of psychological attack.
submitted by CuriousTitmouse to btc [link] [comments]

A theory of why Ethereum is perhaps better "sound money" than Bitcoin.

The idea of Bitcoin's supremacy as "sound money" is very frequently thrown around by the biggest talking heads in the crypto world. I know I will get a lot of hate for suggesting that this theory is not only flawed, but it is straight up wrong. As unintuitive as it may sound to Bitcoin maximalists (no offense intended) I believe Ethereum is on the path to becoming the global leading asset and model for sound money... give me a chance to explain why.
  1. The idea that nothing can change Bitcoin's issuance schedule is a myth. There is absolutely no divine power controlling the supply of Bitcoin. Contrary to what is commonly asserted, Bitcoin's issuance protocol is not primarily driven by what is currently implemented. The real driver is consensus: the majority of network participants must agree that what is currently defined cannot be changed. There is an underlying assumption that the consensus would never want to change Bitcoin's issuance. On the surface this makes for a nice "sound money" narrative, but it is false premise and sticking to it could be ultimately detrimental. It presents a long term sustainability issue (the hope that somehow Bitcoin's base layer will scale enough to maintain security entirely through fees). It also completely dismisses the possibility that an unforeseen event could create pressure to change the issuance. If Bitcoin managed to create a consensus mechanism that did not rely on mining, it is very likely there would be consensus to reduce issuance. On the other hand, if some potentially catastrophic event would create incentives to increase the issuance, it would only make sense for the network to do so.
  2. Issuance flexibility is not fundamentally bad. Etheruem's approach to adjust the issuance according to the contextual circumstances has resulted in a faster rate of issuance reduction than what was originally defined in the protocol. The rate of issuance will continue to decrease as new developments allow for it to happen without compromising the network security. There is a very high probability that Ethereum will achieve a lower issuance rate than Bitcoin in the next two years, and it could possibly achieve zero issuance in the next five years. This would be a result of a successful implementation of PoS, sharding and EIP-1559.
  3. The root of all evil is Proof of Work. PoW is by far the primary cost of operating the Bitcoin network. It is the primary determinant of how much issuance is needed as a financial incentive to keep miners doing their thing. The very mechanism that secures the network's decentralization is unfortunately quite wasteful. The degree of decentralization is a direct result of how much random mathematical operations are being done by miners.
  4. There is a better way. Some people will take offense by the use of the word wasteful, and they claim that it is not because those mindless calculations are what is actually securing the network. However, its wasteful aspect becomes clear if there is a different way to achieve equal or superior decentralization without the need to crunch mathematical problems. This just so happens to be embodied in Ethereum's design of Proof of Stake. It will drastically reduce the cost of securing the network, while providing at least 2-3% annual returns for the ownership of Ether. When Ethereum's issuance becomes lower than its staking rewards, it will effectively have achieved the same effect as having zero (or possibly negative) issuance.
  5. The value proposition of Ethereum 2.0 is unmatched. There is just absolutely no asset in the world that has a 2-3% self-denominated annual returns and just so happens to be rapidly appreciating. When wall-street's greed sees this, it will create the mother of all bubbles.
  6. Don't dismiss the flippening. On February 01 2018 Ethereum reached 70% of Bitcoin's marked cap (it was even closer if you account for the amount of lost bitcoins). That happened before DEFI, before proof of staking was within reach, before multiple effective layer 2 solutions were a thing, before wrapped Bitcoins and before the first signs of mass adoption were on the horizon (like integration with Reddit , VISA and potential to compete with SWIFT). Utility is a huge factor in driving prices, lets not forget how Silk Road played a key role into propelling Bitcoin's value. Yes, Ethereum crashed hard after the peak in 2018, but perhaps it is simply manifesting a higher volatility pattern that is reminiscent of Bitcoin's early years. Bitcoin's first 5 years were characterized by aggressive price swings, why should it be different for Etheruem (considering it is about 5 years younger than Bitcoin)? If the volatility patterns stands on this bull market, we will see a flippening.
So... do I think Etheruem will flip? Yes I do, but I still hold Bitcoin. No one has a crystal ball, and nothing is certain. Perhaps Etheruem will crash and burn, perhaps Bitcoin will become the next Yahoo, and perhaps they will both thrive in this new exciting crypto world.
submitted by TheWierdGuy to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Minimum Viable Issuance - Why Ethereum’s lack of a hard cap on ETH issuance is a good thing.

This post will explain how the argument used by the average Bitcoin maximalist, thinking that they have found Ethereum’s achilles heel when talking about issuance is actually highlighting one of Ethereum’s strong points and one of the main threats to the longevity of the Bitcoin network.
So first let’s answer the question which I know many people have about Ethereum:

What is Ethereum’s ETH issuance schedule?

Ethereum has an issuance policy of Minimum Viable Issuance. So what does this mean exactly? It means that the issuance of ETH will be as low as possible while also maintaining a sufficient budget to pay miners (and soon to be stakers) to keep the network secure. For example, if ETH issuance was halved, miners would drop off the network and stop mining as it is no longer profitable for them to mine. As a result, the network would be less secure as it would cost less money for an attacker to control 51% of the hash power and attack the network. This means that the Ethereum community plans to change ETH issuance as time goes on to maintain a reasonable security budget which will keep the network secure but will also keep inflation in check. We have done this twice in the past with EIP-649 and EIP-1234 which reduced block rewards from 5 ETH per block to 3 ETH and from 3 ETH to 2 ETH respectively. I previously made a graph of ETH issuance over time here: https://redd.it/it8ce7
So while Ethereum doesn’t have a strictly defined issuance schedule, the community will reject any proposals which either put the security of the network at risk such as the recent EIP-2878, or we will reject proposals which will lead to excessive network security and therefore an unnecessarily high inflation rate (or we will accept proposals which reduce issuance after price rises and therefore the security budget rises). This means that when Bitcoiners accuse the Ethereum Foundation of being no better than a central bank because they can “print more Ether”, this is completely untrue. Any proposals made by the EF which would increase issuance unnecessarily would be rejected by the community in the same way that a proposal to increase the supply of Bitcoin from 21 million to 22 million would be rejected. There is a social contract around both Bitcoin’s and Ethereum’s issuance schedules. Any networks or proposals which break the social contracts of 21 million Bitcoins and minimal viable issuance of Ether would be a breach of these contracts and the new proposed network would be labeled by the community as illegitimate and the original network would live on.

So why is minimum viable issuance better than a hard cap?

Minimum viable issuance is better than a hard cap because it puts the most important part of the network first - the security. MVI ensures that the Ethereum network will always have a security budget which keeps the cost of a 51% attack impractically high. Bitcoin on the other hand, halves its security budget every 4 years until eventually only the transaction fees pay for network security. This means that every 4 years, the amount of money paying for network security halves until eventually, the value of attacking the network becomes greater than the security budget and someone performs a 51% attack (technically the security budget only halves if terms of BTC not in dollars. However, even if the price of Bitcoin more than doubles in the time that the security budget halves, the ratio of security budget to value secured on the network still halves, doubling the financial viability of performing a network attack). The strategy to pay for the security budget once Bitcoin issuance stops is for transaction fees to secure the network since transaction fees are paid to miners. Not only does this have its own security problems which I won’t detail here, but unless Bitcoin scales on layer 1 (layer 2 scaling solutions have their own security mechanisms separate from L1), then fees would have to cost well in the thousands of dollars to secure a trillion dollar market cap Bitcoin that is secured by nothing but fees. If Bitcoin maximalists want a 10 trillion or 100 trillion dollar market cap then expect fees to go up another 10 or 100 times from there.
Ethereum on the other hand, will be able to keep its network secure with approximately 1-2% annual issuance being paid to stakers under ETH 2.0. This is because not all of the network will be staking, so if 33 million of the approximately 110 million Ether in existence stakes under ETH 2.0, then paying this 33 million Ether 6% a year (a very decent yield!) would cost just under 2 million ETH per year which would equate to less than 2% annual ETH inflation. This is also before considering EIP-1559 which will burn a portion of transaction fees which will counter the effect of this inflation and potentially even make ETH deflationary if the sum of all burned transaction fees are greater than the annual inflation. Also, under ETH 2.0, an attacker performing a 51% attack would get his funds slashed (they would lose their funds) if they attack the network, meaning that they can only perform a 51% attack once. However, in Bitcoin, anyone who controls 51% of the mining hash power could perform multiple 51% attacks without losing everything like they could in ETH 2.0.
So in conclusion, while Ethereum doesn’t have the guaranteed anti-inflation security of a hard cap, it does have the guarantee of always paying it’s miners (or stakers under ETH 2.0) enough to keep the network secure. In contrast, while Bitcoin’s social contract may guarantee a hard cap of 21 million, it cannot simultaneously guarantee network security in the long run. Eventually, its users will have to decide if they want a secure network with more than 21 million coins or a tax to pay for security or an insecure network with super high fees and a hard cap of 21 million Bitcoin.
Disclaimer: The details I covered around 51% attacks and network security are simplified. I am not an expert in this field and things are a lot more nuanced than I laid out in my simplifications above.
submitted by Tricky_Troll to ethfinance [link] [comments]

The greatest wealth transfer of this century! An analysis: British-US-Chinese Empires: Gold, Silver, Bitcoin, Ethereum!

"Inflation makes you pay 50 dollars for the 20 dollar haircut you used to get for 5 dollars when you had hair!"
Let's embark on a journey that made the United States the number 1 economy of the world.

1. Despite the British Empire's claim that it would for ever remain the leading empire,history can serve as a harbinger for what's to come...

At the peak of its power, in 1913, "the empire on which the sun never sets", controlled 25% of the planet's land mass and about the same percentage of the world's population. Britain was both the naval an imperial power of the 19th century, and between 1812-1914, its dominance resulted in relative peace in Europe and the rest of the world. The industrial revolution transformed Britain into the workshop of the world.
By the start of the 20th century things changed as both Germany and the United States started to challenge Britain's economic and influential leadership. As often happened during human history such challenging lead to war and although Britain achieved its largest territorial influence after WW1, the war had destroyed much of its economic strength, with losses in industrial and military power marking the begin of its demise.
During WW2, Japan occupied Britain's colonies, and after WW2, India, Britain's most valuable and populous possession, achieved independence. Much of the British Empire's influence is now enshrined in the Commonwealth Charter, stating shared values like democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
The United Kingdom's pound sterling was its world's reserve currency during its reign and by controlling the supply of money, Britain was able to influence its global power.
"Permit me to issue and control the money of a nation, and I care not who makes its laws!" Mayer Amschel Rothschild

2. The US Empire repeats this blueprint by claiming the U.S. Dollar's reserve currency status as its birthright!

The Federal Reserve Act.
The Panic of 1907 triggered many American's belief that The Federal Reserve Act, passed by the 63rd United States Congress and signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson on December 23, 1913, was necessary for financial and economic stability. The law created the Federal Reserve System, the central banking system of the United States.
The Bretton Woods System.
The FED ended immobile reserve issues and the inelastic currency problems and successfully internationalized the U.S Dollar as the global reserve currency. The usage of the prior nationally used U.S. Dollar expanded a first time when the Allies agreed to the terms of the Bretton Woods System, establishing the rules for commercial as well as financial regulations among the United States and its allies. Canada, Western Europe, Australia and Japan accepted the U.S. Dollar, which was backed by a gold exchange standard, making the U.S. Dollar "as good as gold". This was only possible because the United States controlled two thirds of the world's gold reserves.
Soviet representatives, who claimed that institutions like the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were Wall Street branches, didn't participate in Bretton Woods and later proved to be right, as the United States printed too much money (not backed by its gold reserves) to wage war on Vietnam, destroying a big part of the value of the U.S. Dollars held by its allies, due to the inflation of the U.S. Dollar money supply.
Yet, the initial demand for U.S. dollars created the American way of life: a consumer driven economy fueled by products made outside the U.S. in return for U.S. Dollars. As the Allied countries couldn't really buy any "Made in America"-products, due to the fact that the United States' elites rather outsourced their manufacturing, they instead invested their hard labor into U.S. Treasuries.
On August 1971, President Richard Nixon announced the unilateral cancellation of the direct international convertibility of the United States dollar to gold, in a response to halt the Allied countries' continuous attempts to exchange their U.S. Dollars for Gold. By 1973, the Bretton Woods system was replaced by the current freely floating fiat currency system.
The petro dollar system.
The second wave of U.S. Dollar adoption was the result of the petro dollar, making the global trade of oil U.S. Dollar denominated. Every country on this planet needed and still needs oil to operate and grow its economy, creating an enormous growth in U.S. Dollar demand and like mentioned before, those dollars had to be earned. Especially China served the United States consumer model by producing almost everything Americans can buy in Wall Mart and other stores. By relying on the U.S. Dollar reserve currency status, the American elites have made the mistake of outsourcing manufacturing to China, as often predicted by Donald Trump in the 1980's. The y figured it was easier to just print wealth.
The tradewar.
President Donald Trump, decided it was time to bring jobs back to the U.S. and started an ongoing trade war with China, the country that supplied the U.S. consumer driven economy, and proud owner of $1.07 trillion in Treasury holdings. The trade war has negatively impacted the economies of both the United States and China and will most likely result in the decoupling of both economies.
What is to come? My personal insights.
I see huge problems for the U.S. and the rest of the western liberal democracies. But especially the United States, who's currency amounts to no less than 60% of all the world's reserve assets, is vulnerable if and when China who only accounts for 1 or 2 %, says it is time for change. Most likely we will experience another banking crisis, with or without Covid-19, and unfortunately a bigger one when compared to the 2008 dissaster. Did you know that the global debt tripled since then? Many economists and politicians advocate the end of the U.S. Dollar reserve currency system and predict a reset. Every financial system has a limited lifespan similar to a human live: it is created, it grows, it matures, and unfortunately, it ages, weakens and dies. It happened to the Brittish Pound Sterling, and I am afraid that the days of this financial hegemony are numbered as well.
And I did write "afraid", why?
History tells us that these transition periods are particularly dangerous and have often led to full-blown military conflicts if not world wars. The current wealth transfer, the result of manufacturing outsourcing to mainland China, impoverished the United States and destroyed its middle class. President Donald Trump's analysis that the U.S. needs a strong manufacturing base is correct, yet without its allies the United States will not be able to turn the tide.
It took China decades to build its manufacturing base, and President Trump doesn't have the privilege of having the political luxury to design five year plans, as the United States capitalistic and political model specializes more on presidential campaigning and less on economic planning, which is exactly China's strength.

3. The Chinese 'digital' empire.

China is ideally positioned to become the new global power: it produces many of our products and dominates most supply chains. It has been hoarding gold and mines most of the Bitcoin. It might just have the right reserve assets to back its DCEP, the digital Yuan, which will be pilot tested during the 2022 Winter Olympics hosted by China. Despite the fact that the United States and other western nations might not want to adopt the Yuan or allow it to be part of the world's reserve assets, China can demand payment in Yuan for its products. It's that simple! This is why outsourcing is such as stupid economic voluntarily yet fatal policy. If you only print money and don't produce goods, how long will the world play ball?
One of the results of Trump's trade war is that China and other countries such as Russia and Iran no longer want to be vulnerable to U.S. sanctions that come in the shape of being denied access to the financial system through Swift. The United States can indeed destroy a big part of Iran's economy, but Iran is now becoming a big cryptocurrency player. In other words, bullying those countries might work in the short-term, but in the long-term they will simply adopt a new standard: and I believe that the Yuan will likely play a major role in the financial system they will adopt.
This trend means that the expansion of the demand in U.S. Dollars will stop and reverse, when countries no longer want to use the currency whose issuer can economically destroy them through sanctions. The alternatives for such countires are cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum and many others, national CBDC's (Central Bank Digital Currencies), and the adoption of the digital Yuan.
This digital Yuan will be attached to the One Belt, One road initiative, finding adoption whilst developing huge infrastructure projects that will lead to a Eurasian trading zone. If the U.S. Military leaves the Middle East, as Trump brings home troops, this will create the right conditions for China to emerge as the victor.

4. Surveillance Capitalism - Insights on the DCEP (Digital Currency Electronic Payment, DC/EP):

  1. This centralized digital financial system works on blockchain and cryptographic principles and aims to increase the circulation of the RMB, in the hope it can become a reserve currency like the U.S. Dollar.
  2. Created and sanctioned by the Chinese Government, it is the only legal digital currency in China.
  3. The system offers Chinese regulators better monitoring abilities and will be an efficient tool against anonymous counterfeiting, money laundering and illegal financing. At the same time it reduces costs involved in maintaining and recycling bank notes and coins.
  4. As mentioned above, China aims to bypass Swift, which it regards to be a U.S. entity, and will be able to collect real-time data related to money creation, bookkeeping, essential information for the implementation of monetary policies.
  5. The pilot institutions for DCEP, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, will serve as a production test for China's new currency system, after which the DCEP will be distributed to large fintech companies such as Tencent and Alibaba to be used in WeChat Pay and AliPay. Transfers will not go through bank accounts, but through electronic wallets.
  6. By mandating that all merchants who accept digital payments must accept DCEP, the DECP will become the most accepted digital currency in the world.

5. Sings of hope.

If the United States adopts blockchain and issues a CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) backed by Bitcoin, they will have a reasonable chance to offer the western democracies a new type of dollar standard that can be an anchor versus the coming RMB. If not, I fear the worst is yet to come for the U.S. Dollar and its economy.
Many smart American economists and Wall Street goeroe's have finally figured out the remarkable strength of Bitcoin, the world's first and most favorite digital form of gold.
Some of the smartest investment capitalists like Ray Dalio and Warren Buffet have allocated more money into gold, a clear sign of trouble. Bitcoin might be a step too far for Warren Buffet, but rest assure that Wall Street investment management companies have figured it out by now, have you?
You can expect more institutions to allocate a % of their portfolio's wealth into Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, as a hedge against the systemic risk in our global financial system, which will inevitable start feeling the effects of the trillions that have been printed.
"Inflation makes you pay 50 dollars for the 20 dollar haircut you used to get for 5 dollars when you had hair!"
submitted by O_My_Crypto to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given public key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history
The original intention of this article is to let readers understand the causes and consequences of Bitmain internal fighting, but after writing it, I found that it is not so much internal fighting as it is a long history of self-help.
The story is very long. Let's adjust the timeline to the eve of December 17, 2018. That was one of Bitmain's most critical moments and the beginning of a series of subsequent stories.
1. Self-immolation In September 2018, Bitmain's financial department warned management that the company's cash flow has become very tight and operating costs must be reduced to allow the company to continue. The blockchain unicorn, which is valued at more than 15 billion U.S. dollars, is crippled in the run and struggling to break the corner.
In 2017, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars In the first half of 2018, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars Three rounds of financing, a total of 800 million US dollars Net assets should exceed 3 billion U.S. dollars In September 2018, Bitmain had tight cash flow and was on the verge of bankruptcy
A simple comparison, it is not difficult to see that Bitmain's ability to make money is incredible, and its ability to burn money is even more extreme.
How does Bitmain burn money? Do you pour cash into gasoline and burn it, or hire a lot of employees to stuff the banknotes one by one into the shredder? The actual situation is closer to the latter.
The following data can help readers quickly learn Bitmain's money burning skills.
At the beginning of 2018, the entire cryptocurrency market has entered a bear market, but Bitmain's monthly operating costs have been rising wildly. Operating costs have risen from 10 million US dollars at the beginning of the year to 50 million US dollars at the end of the year.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
Operating costs are just the tip of the iceberg. Excessive chip trial production can become a classic case of project management courses. Readers who pay attention to Cryptocurrency mining can easily find that Bitmain is still working hard to clear the inventory of Antminer S9 in 2019. As the co-CEO, Ketuan Zhan did not listen to the advice or even warnings of the Finance Department, insisting on the implementation of Excessive chip trial production, resulting in a large accumulation of inventory and tight capital turnover. Another CEO, Jihan Wu, once revealed that the loss of Excessive chip trial production to the company was approximately US$1.5 billion.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
The BM1393 chip incident is even more incredible. Chip expert Ketuan Zhan invested a lot of money on a failed chip, and finally failed again. From 2017 to 2018, Bitmain has failed Trial production of mining machine chips at least 4 times, including 16nm, 12nm and 10nm chips, of which 16nm Trial production failed twice, thus losing at least US$1.2 billion.
It is rumored that Bitmain still holds a billion U.S. dollars worth of cryptocurrency in a state of floating loss. In view of the rebound in the market in 2020, we will not comment temporarily, waiting for the correct answer from the cryptocurrency market. But the losses pointed out in the previous article are all irreversible.
2. Sole power
In September 2018, Bitmain's management realized the seriousness of the problem. It turned out that the company's money could be squandered. As a result, the management began to discuss self-help plans, and the most reasonable and effective way was obviously to lay off employees.
The probation period for newly hired employees at Bitmain is half a year, and the probationary salary is 100% of the official salary, there is no difference. Once layoffs are made, new employees who have not passed the probationary period will be the main layoff targets. The department managed by Ketuan Zhan will face large-scale layoffs. The layoff plan is strongly opposed by Ketuan Zhan. Bitmain can only temporarily abandon the layoffs and replace it with continuous reductions. For marketing and travel expenses, a budget committee was established to strictly approve every expenditure. At the same time, employee benefits, such as reimbursement of taxi expenses, breakfast supply, snacks and drinks, etc., have also been abolished, and even the tradition of giving employees 400 yuan worth of BTC/BCH every month has been stopped.
In the face of huge cash flow pressure, trivial savings is obviously of no avail. Soon, the management again discussed the layoff plan, and it has reached the point where it has to be laid off.
In December 2018, Jihan Wu began to organize all entrepreneurial veterans and business backbones to persuade Ketuan Zhan to agree to layoffs, but Ketuan Zhan still insisted not to layoffs. The persuasion process was very unsuccessful. After many meetings and intense debates, Bitmain executives were caught in a dilemma of wasting time with Ketuan Zhan.
In this process, the shortcomings of the dual CEO system began to appear, and the relationship between the two CEOs gradually deteriorated.
On the night of December 16th, Ketuan Zhan reconvened the management meeting, and more than 30 managements who were present were asked to hand over their mobile phones. At this time, Jihan Wu was on a business trip in Hong Kong and was busy with listing related work.
In the meeting, Ketuan Zhan's core content was three items:
(1) Bitmain cannot have two CEOs, only one CEO and must be Ketuan Zhan. Ketuan Zhan said that he met an old leader during a business trip. He hadn't seen each other for many years. The old leader suggested that the company can only have one CEO, and it must be him. Ketuan Zhan feels that this is a kind of fate, an opportunity given by God.
(2) Ketuan Zhan believes that the company's cash flow problems, the biggest responsibility is the inability of the financial department. To prove his point, Ketuan Zhan announced Bitmain's financial data at the meeting. In the evening, employees in Taiwan began to post messages on social media, saying that the company's capital chain was broken and the top management was split.
(3) If Ketuan Zhan is not supported, the option will be cancelled and the equity will be voided.
Hearing about this, Jihan Wu, who lives in Hong Kong, sent a WeChat message to the management who are attending the meeting.

https://preview.redd.it/zkj2d44tqid51.jpg?width=1080&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=9251c1f7308e155d7911d5969e71091a5ad5e14a
On the afternoon of December 17, 2018, Jihan Wu returned to Beijing to negotiate with Ketuan Zhan all night, and finally reached a consensus in the early morning. Bitmain co-founder Yuesheng Ge announced the results of the negotiations. Jihan Wu and Ketuan Zhan ceased to serve as CEOs, and Haichao Wang served as CEO. Jihan Wu voluntarily backed down and Ketuan Zhan served as chairman.
The "12.17 Incident" had a very bad impact on Bitmain, especially the disclosure of Bitmain's financial status, which caused vendors to start dunning. The loan that had just been negotiated with the Bank of Beijing was cancelled the next day. Jihan Wu's resignation as CEO caused an uproar in the industry, and it became a hot topic among Cryptocurrency mining, blockchain practitioners, and investor communities. The media focused their interpretation on Bitmain's series of incidents, and generally looked down upon its ongoing Hong Kong IPO, believing that the high-level changes had already signaled the failure of the IPO in advance.
On Christmas December 24, 2018, Bitmain finally began to implement the layoff plan. This long-delayed “correct decision” was achieved after a stalemate for nearly three months. The AI ​​teams in Beijing, Singapore, Taiwan, and Shanghai have laid off more than 50% of their employees. The Israeli R&D center was closed and Shenzhen New Species Technology Co., Ltd., which had been acquired for only ten months, was dissolved, and all employees were laid off. Copernicus, Bitmain's top blockchain development team, was not spared and was wiped out in this layoff. Copernicus and some of the laid-off employees joined the new company Matrixport co-founded by Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge, headquartered in Singapore.
3. Past events when starting a business
After the "12.17 Incident", Jihan Wu gradually faded out of Bitmain's management affairs and turned his attention to the IPO and new company. And this is one of Jihan Wu's major mistakes, he began to let Ketuan Zhan manage Bitmain alone.
In fact, as early as 2013, Jihan Wu planted hidden dangers.
Jihan Wu, an investment banker, was the earliest translator of the Bitcoin white paper. He began to get involved in the cryptocurrency mining industry in 2012. The disappearance of Kaomao and Nangua Zhang's ticket skipping led Jihan Wu to decide to develop his own chip.
In 2013, Jihan Wu established his own mining machine company. Together with Yuesheng Ge, who was only 20 years old, he found Ketuan Zhan, an integrated circuit designer of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to create the protagonist of this article, and later the digital Cryptocurrency mining giant, Bitmain.
Jihan Wu promised Ketuan Zhan that every time a mining machine chip was successfully developed, he would give some shares to the Ketuan Zhan team. At that time, the company founded by Ketuan Zhan was on the eve of falling apart. In order to regroup the team, Ketuan Zhan promised to share half of his shares with the team members. Unfortunately, this is just a bad check. With the rapid development of Bitmain and higher and higher valuations, the expanding Ketuan Zhan almost monopolized all the shares.
Like many startups, Bitmain encountered many difficulties in its early days, and many jobs had to be done by the boss. For example, in the chip design and production process in the second half of 2013, Bitmain was caught in a dilemma of insufficient funds. Jihan Wu personally raised funds and met with TSMC’s sales to persuade TSMC to accept the production needs of a start-up company. Jihan Wu also participated in the selection of the thermodynamic parameters of the heat sink in the Antminer S1.
In 2014, Jihan Wu discovered that this company was independently operated by Ketuan Zhan, which had huge problems. Forcing Jihan Wu to continue to participate in company management.
At that time, Bitmain's mining machine chips had just achieved a certain lead in the standard design process. Jihan Wu believes that the next step must be to develop full customization technology, but Ketuan Zhan plans to invest resources in the research of mobile payment chips.
Ketuan Zhan met a mysterious person from the Party Central Security Bureau who claimed to be able to manipulate the Party Central Committee’s decision-making process for the next generation of mobile payment cryptography standards, but this direction is likely to lead to the fact that Bitmain has just gained the lead in the mining machine market. Regained.
Jihan Wu said that as a graduate of the School of Economics, with a little memory of his high school stage and the knowledge reserve of a computer technology amateur, he retrieves various materials and papers every day, learns theories related to full customization, and goes to Ketuan Zhan conducts persuasion work there.
Fortunately, in the direction of full customization technology, Ketuan Zhan finally listened to Jihan Wu's opinion. Bitmain quickly integrated the technical experts from the United States and Russia introduced by Jihan Wu, which greatly improved the design level of chips and complete machines.
In 2015, Jihan Wu suggested that Ketuan Zhan consider the direction of artificial intelligence. But Ketuan Zhan is not here, he prefers the CPU direction. After staying asleep at night, coupled with in-depth analysis by the Bitmain investment team, Ketuan Zhan finally agreed with this direction. It is a pity that after the Tianshi Chen brothers made major breakthroughs in theory and practice, Bitmain officially invested in the relevant direction, and it was still a step behind.
In the two years from 2016 to 2017, Bitmain's business performance has achieved rapid development, becoming a unique super unicorn in the blockchain industry. According to Froth & Sullivan, in 2017, Bitmain Technology Holdings was the second largest fabless chip design company in China and the tenth largest fabless chip design company in the world, and the fourth largest fabless ASIC chip design company in the world, accounting for 74.5% of global cryptocurrency market share.
However, the huge crisis has long been buried in the early days of entrepreneurship.
Ketuan Zhan's decision on major directions revealed his weakness of extremely lack of business understanding. But every mistake he made was blocked by the company's core employees. His overconfidence in his management ability led to the gradual intensification of conflicts, and the management differences between the two founders became more serious.
4.The giant gets lost
The contradiction between the two broke out on December 17, 2018. Ketuan Zhan used extreme means to force the management to compromise with him by canceling the option, so as to achieve the goal of sole control of the company. Jihan Wu returned to Beijing from Hong Kong overnight and negotiated with Ketuan Zhan all night. In the end, the two resigned as CEO. Jihan Wu retired. Ketuan Zhan has the exclusive rights of chairman in exchange for the implementation of the layoff plan.
Jihan Wu's voluntary retreat has intensified Ketuan Zhan's management to do whatever he wants.
A Bitmain employee commented on Ketuan Zhan's management skills, summed up in two letters-SM.
After becoming the sole helm of the company, Ketuan Zhan quickly "rectified" the department in charge of Jihan Wu as the chairman of the board. He guided the sales of mining machines at the dinner, and pointed out that the sales performance is not due to the sales staff. Ability is strong, but the company provides opportunities. Take two sales leaders as examples, saying that if the company hadn't given the opportunity, they would still be losers. In addition, Ketuan Zhan also instructed the sales staff on how to toast and imparted the wine table culture and experience.
After the meal, Ketuan Zhan came to the conclusion that the quality of Bitmain sales staff was too poor, and Huawei’s blood needs to be injected to drive the company’s progress. Soon, the marketing and sales director from Huawei officially took over Bitmain, opening the era of brand premium for Antminer.
In order to further understand and guide the sales work, Ketuan Zhan asked to meet the customers with the sales staff. During the negotiation process, Ketuan Zhan had a heated discussion with customers on the issue of Chinese and Western medicine, and had also forced the sales staff to be able to ship 10,000 machines due to insufficient production capacity.
Although the requirements for sales personnel are strict, Ketuan Zhan has provided a lot of convenience for "Mainland Ark". In addition to selling mining machines at a more favorable price, Bitmain's mining machines are also hosted in Ming Wang at a higher price than the market price. Mine. It is reported that both Ketuan Zhan and Ming Wang are shareholders of Ark.
The new sales strategy of Huawei's executives has also brought very obvious changes to Bitmain. The self-righteous brand premium reduces the price-performance ratio of Antminer, causing competing products to eat away at Bitmain's market share. Later, Bitmain found that the strategy was wrong and started to cut prices, and found that the mining machine market was saturated and the purchase demand of miners had decreased.
More dangerous than the sales strategy is that the technical advantages of Antminer are being chased by competing products, and even overtaken. At the same time, the two mining pools under Bitmain also lost their first and second positions. The AI ​​business, which Jihan Wu placed high hopes and Ketuan Zhan personally supervised, became a laughing stock in the industry. Not only did it fail to make a profit, it almost brought down Bitmain.
Blindly introducing senior executives from Huawei to occupy important positions completely destroys the company's internal cultural foundation. The bureaucracy within Bitmain began to corrode from high-level employees to ordinary employees. Ketuan Zhan is not aware of this. He is still keen on recruiting Huawei employees, imitating Huawei's organizational structure and strategy, letting HR do sales and R&D personnel to do HR.
The organizational structure adjustment in October 2019 was the fuse for Ketuan Zhan to completely anger Bitmain management. This time, Ketuan Zhan completely marginalized Bitmain’s veteran employees, and suddenly promoted some of the “airborne soldiers” who had just joined the company to the position of person in charge, which caused the former person in charge to report to the new employees. The two managers who were originally equal The hierarchy becomes the subordinate relationship, the operation and development of different business lines are merged into a large department, the upward reporting process becomes more cumbersome, and the relationship between employees becomes delicate.
5. Headwind
On October 29, 2019, Jihan Wu urgently held a staff meeting. Prior to this, the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain has been changed to Jihan Wu, including the parent companies Hong Kong Bitmain and Cayman Bitmain. Jihan Wu stood in the lobby of Building 25, B1, announcing that Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Any employee in the Bitmain Group shall no longer execute Ketuan Zhan’s instructions and participate in any meetings convened by Ketuan Zhan. If there is any violation, the company will demotion and expel the company based on the severity of the circumstances. If losses are caused to the company, the company will be held accountable.
Jihan Wu's speech is very long, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Also expelled from the original Huawei company HR Zhi Wang introduced by Ketuan Zhan at the end of 2018. Zhi Wang’s reputation on Bitmain was extremely poor and was ridiculed by employees as "nine thousand years" (In ancient China, the emperor was called "ten thousand years old", and the prince was "eight thousand years old." However, in the Ming Dynasty, there was an eunuch who caused harm to the country and the people. He called himself "nine thousand years old", meaning that he was only A little lower than the emperor's level).
(2) Ketuan Zhan's ability to control the company's option incentive plan has disappeared, and it is no longer possible to cancel employees' options at will.
(3) The organizational structure adjustment plan led by Ketuan Zhan was suspended.
(4) We are optimistic about the future of AI business, but the premise is that the main business can continue to make profits in order to support the company's continued investment in AI business.
In the speech, Jihan Wu also told employees the whole story of the "12.17 Incident" and bluntly said that the company is not in good condition. If no measures are taken, Bitmain is likely to go bankrupt in three quarters and he must come back to save the company.
At this time, Ketuan Zhan, who was on a business trip in Shenzhen, finally experienced the situation of Jihan Wu in the "12.17 Incident".
After the official return, Jihan Wu began to clearly point out the company's various problems in operation and management, and went deep into each business line to understand the situation. In the mining machine sales department meeting, employees spoke enthusiastically, reflecting on the difficulties and opinions encountered in the work, the marketing and sales director from Huawei asked with a surprised look, "Why didn't these issues be reported to me before?", and soon , The director was interviewed and "voluntarily resigned."
On November 2, 2019, Jihan Wu announced a salary increase for all employees. Bitmain’s last salary increase dates back to 2018. In principle, Bitmain has two salary increases every year.
On November 7, 2019, Ketuan Zhan spoke on social media for the first time, describing his hardship in starting a business, and condemning Jihan Wu for “stabbing a knife in the back”. At the end of the article, he also set himself a KPI for 2020, that is, the mining machine market share will reach 90%, and the AI ​​business will earn 1 billion.
But Ketuan Zhan's majestic plan did not make Bitmain employees feel emotional, but ridiculed him instead. Employees exposed that he insulted employees, advocated Chinese medicine, believed in Buddhism, drank in meetings, practiced Qigong...
However, there is less than half a year before the halving of Bitcoin production, and the cryptocurrency market shows no signs of recovery, which makes Bitmain management very anxious.
On January 6, 2020, Bitmain ushered in another round of layoffs, with a layoff ratio of about 1/3. This time the layoffs have caused many employees who have just increased their salaries to feel very grieved. On the one hand, they were looking forward to Jihan Wu's return. On the other hand, the compensation for this layoff was less than 18 years.
Ketuan Zhan, who has been unable to enter the Bitmain office area, once again spoke on social media and firmly opposed to layoffs. We do not need to lay off staff and we cannot commit suicide.
During the Spring Festival, Covid-19 broke out. Mainland China has begun to extend the Spring Festival holiday and advocate working from home. Under the chain reaction caused by Covid-19, most companies have chosen to cut salaries or even lay off employees. In the first two months of 2020, China's exports fell by 17%, U.S. stocks were broken four times in a row, Bitcoin plunged 40% in 24 hours on March 12, 2020, and crude oil futures fell by 300% on April 20, 2020...
Obviously, Jihan Wu can't predict, but this layoff seems to be the right decision again. In addition, from January to April 2020, Bitmain's revenue exceeded US$400 million amid the spread of Covid-19 and the collapse of the financial market.
6. Fight to the death
When Jihan Wu tried to get the company back on track, Ketuan Zhan was not helpless. On April 28, 2020, Ketuan Zhan finally rolled back the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain to before October 28, 2019 by repeatedly submitting administrative reconsiderations, and restored his status as a legal representative.
On the morning of May 8, 2020, a piece of news about Bitmain quickly appeared on the real-time hot search rankings, and even dominated the headlines of the day. At window 52 on the second floor of the Haidian District Government Affairs Center, when Ketuan Zhan, the legal person of Beijing Bitmain Company, was receiving the business license, a group of unidentified people snatched the business license from the industrial and commercial administrative staff. A source at the scene said that the number of unidentified people in the group was about 60 people, of which Luyao Liu was directing at the scene.
This is a skillful piece of news. It first leads readers to think that Ketuan Zhan is a victim, using 60 people to grab business licenses as the focus. The masses accused Jihan Wu of lawlessness, but ignored whether the government affairs center could have 60 personnel. As for Hong Kong Bitmain to have the right to appoint a representative to obtain a business license, this is a deeper level of thinking.
The follow-up report restored the real situation at the scene. Only more than ten people were present, and both sides were equipped with security personnel. Bitmain employees also broke the news in the circle of friends, claiming that Ketuan Zhan's bodyguard had injured Bitmain's authorized person, and said in a threatening tone, "Be careful!"
However, the subsequent plot reversal did not have much effect. Jihan Wu's reputation has been greatly affected. From a bloody soldier who rescued the company in trouble to a lawless criminal, it can be said to be a world of war. do not.
Ketuan Zhan, who succeeded in the first battle, began to counterattack Bitmain continuously. On the afternoon of June 3, 2020, Ketuan Zhan led a team to pry open the back door of the Beijing Bitmain office and formally occupied the deserted Beijing headquarters.
On June 4, 2020, Ketuan Zhan called on Bitmain employees to resume work and promised to expand the company's market value to more than US$50 billion within three to five years. After that, Ketuan Zhan began to contact employees by phone, trying to acquire the options in the hands of employees at a valuation of 4 billion US dollars.
Subsequently, Ketuan Zhan recalled Huawei's executives and issued a series of personnel appointments and removals. As of June 9, 2020, Ketuan Zhan has successively eliminated CFO Luyao Liu, and Wenguang Wang, the head of the mining center. Luyao Liu is responsible for controlling Bitmain's IPO plan. He also appointed Yanwu Ma as the HR director, Gang Ren as the head of the mining center, Yonggang Sun as the head of the supply chain, Ling Gu as the financial director, and Bin Zhu as the head of the mining machine business department. Bin Zhu is the senior executive of Huawei who was interviewed and left as mentioned in the previous article. During his tenure, he reduced Antminer’s 90% market share to 50%, and received a large number of complaints from miners. Internal employees once speculated that he might be Compete against the spies sent by the company.
In addition to recalling senior executives of Huawei, Ketuan Zhan also urged employees to return to work. They can receive a bonus of 10,000 yuan when they return to work on the same day, which is only half the next day. Ketuan Zhan showed a very kind side. Every time the elevator door is opened, Ketuan Zhan's hot gaze can be met, shaking hands, taking photos, and receiving money. As there is no personnel information, Ketuan Zhan does not know whether the person receiving the money is a Bitmain employee, and these people did not resume work the next day.
The effect of gentleness was not good, Ketuan Zhan began to force employees to return to work. Seeing that there are still very few respondents, Ketuan Zhan threatened employees through SMS, phone calls, EMS, emails and other harassment, issued multiple threats such as termination of contract, suspension of payment of social insurance, suspension of wages, and even used personal information saved by employees to form a group of employees. Domicile threats, requiring employees to perform "work handover", trying to force employees to return work computers, etc.
On June 10, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan had controlled Bitmain's Shenzhen factory and prohibited employees from delivering normal shipments to paid customers, which caused difficulties in the operation of the Bitmain mining machine department.
On June 13, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain, the parent company of Beijing Bitmain, issued a statement accusing Ketuan Zhan of signing a "Sales Agency Agreement" with the Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd. in which it holds shares, in an attempt to embezzle Beijing Bit's assets.
On June 17, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan started selling 14,000 T17+ series mining machines at low prices.
On June 20, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain officially suspended the supply of chips to the Shenzhen factory.
On July 13, 2020, in the "A Letter to All My colleagues in the Shenzhen Factory" released by Bitmain in Hong Kong, more details were added on the series of Ketuan Zhan's actions in June.
The legal person Feng Zhou of the Shenzhen plant is related to Ketuan Zhan. After being relieved of Ketuan Zhan's post, Jihan Wu flew to Shenzhen to have a long talk with Feng Zhou. Jihan Wu believes that Feng Zhou is the right person to manage the factory and help the company overcome difficulties, and decides to leave Feng Zhou to continue to manage the factory.
This wrong decision staged a story of a farmer and a snake. When Ketuan Zhan began to counterattack Bitmain, Feng Zhou was also quickly instigated and began to assist Ketuan Zhan in seizing customer machines and transferring 17,000 T17 mining machines in the warehouse. Hainan Continental Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd., which is held by Ketuan Zhan, sold them at a low price.
In order to protect the interests of customers, Jihan Wu had to make a compromise and paid the payment for some goods to a bank account controlled by Ketuan Zhan in exchange for delivery. However, after the other party received a payment of 109 million, the delivery stopped. On July 8, 2020, 5600 mining machines have been overdue.
At the same time, the factory defaulted on suppliers’ accounts payable as much as 200 million yuan. Bank acceptance bills issued by the factory, exceeding 36 million yuan, will expire on July 17, and more than 34 million yuan will expire on July 23. It is understood that Ketuan Zhan, after receiving the bank's dunning call, made it clear that he would not repay the loan, which would destroy the company and the entire group's credit in financial institutions.
7、 This is not the end
So far, the power struggle between the founders of Bitmain has been more than half a year. The office building already occupied by Ketuan Zhan is still empty, and most employees choose to work from home. Some chip developers returned to the office with the acquiescence of Jihan Wu and continued to maintain research and development to reduce the impact of infighting on technological iteration and competitiveness.
This giant ship that once stood on top of the supercomputer chip is crashing into the iceberg due to the madness of the former helm. Ketuan Zhan's madness and Jihan Wu's compromise made mistakes again and again. Bitmain tried to save himself many times, but was unable to get out of the black hole.
If the time goes back to that day in 2013, would Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge still choose to dial Ketuan Zhan?
submitted by paulcheung1990 to Bitcoincash [link] [comments]

Minimum Viable Issuance - Why Ethereum’s lack of a hard cap on ETH issuance is a good thing.

This post will explain how the argument used by the average Bitcoin maximalist, thinking that they have found Ethereum’s achilles heel when talking about issuance is actually highlighting one of Ethereum’s strong points and one of the main threats to the longevity of the Bitcoin network.
So first let’s answer the question which I know many people have about Ethereum:

What is Ethereum’s ETH issuance schedule?

Ethereum has an issuance policy of Minimum Viable Issuance. So what does this mean exactly? It means that the issuance of ETH will be as low as possible while also maintaining a sufficient budget to pay miners (and soon to be stakers) to keep the network secure. For example, if ETH issuance was halved, miners would drop off the network and stop mining as it is no longer profitable for them to mine. As a result, the network would be less secure as it would cost less money for an attacker to control 51% of the hash power and attack the network. This means that the Ethereum community plans to change ETH issuance as time goes on to maintain a reasonable security budget which will keep the network secure but will also keep inflation in check. We have done this twice in the past with EIP-649 and EIP-1234 which reduced block rewards from 5 ETH per block to 3 ETH and from 3 ETH to 2 ETH respectively. I previously made a graph of ETH issuance over time here: https://redd.it/it8ce7
So while Ethereum doesn’t have a strictly defined issuance schedule, the community will reject any proposals which either put the security of the network at risk such as the recent EIP-2878, or we will reject proposals which will lead to excessive network security and therefore an unnecessarily high inflation rate (or we will accept proposals which reduce issuance after price rises and therefore the security budget rises). This means that when Bitcoiners accuse the Ethereum Foundation of being no better than a central bank because they can “print more Ether”, this is completely untrue. Any proposals made by the EF which would increase issuance unnecessarily would be rejected by the community in the same way that a proposal to increase the supply of Bitcoin from 21 million to 22 million would be rejected. There is a social contract around both Bitcoin’s and Ethereum’s issuance schedules. Any networks or proposals which break the social contracts of 21 million Bitcoins and minimal viable issuance of Ether would be a breach of these contracts and the new proposed network would be labeled by the community as illegitimate and the original network would live on.

So why is minimum viable issuance better than a hard cap?

Minimum viable issuance is better than a hard cap because it puts the most important part of the network first - the security. MVI ensures that the Ethereum network will always have a security budget which keeps the cost of a 51% attack impractically high. Bitcoin on the other hand, halves its security budget every 4 years until eventually only the transaction fees pay for network security. This means that every 4 years, the amount of money paying for network security halves until eventually, the value of attacking the network becomes greater than the security budget and someone performs a 51% attack (technically the security budget only halves if terms of BTC not in dollars. However, even if the price of Bitcoin more than doubles in the time that the security budget halves, the ratio of security budget to value secured on the network still halves, doubling the financial viability of performing a network attack). The strategy to pay for the security budget once Bitcoin issuance stops is for transaction fees to secure the network since transaction fees are paid to miners. Not only does this have its own security problems which I won’t detail here, but unless Bitcoin scales on layer 1 (layer 2 scaling solutions have their own security mechanisms separate from L1), then fees would have to cost well in the thousands of dollars to secure a trillion dollar market cap Bitcoin that is secured by nothing but fees. If Bitcoin maximalists want a 10 trillion or 100 trillion dollar market cap then expect fees to go up another 10 or 100 times from there.
Ethereum on the other hand, will be able to keep its network secure with approximately 1-2% annual issuance being paid to stakers under ETH 2.0. This is because not all of the network will be staking, so if 33 million of the approximately 110 million Ether in existence stakes under ETH 2.0, then paying this 33 million Ether 6% a year (a very decent yield!) would cost just under 2 million ETH per year which would equate to less than 2% annual ETH inflation. This is also before considering EIP-1559 which will burn a portion of transaction fees which will counter the effect of this inflation and potentially even make ETH deflationary if the sum of all burned transaction fees are greater than the annual inflation. Also, under ETH 2.0, an attacker performing a 51% attack would get his funds slashed (they would lose their funds) if they attack the network, meaning that they can only perform a 51% attack once. However, in Bitcoin, anyone who controls 51% of the mining hash power could perform multiple 51% attacks without losing everything like they could in ETH 2.0.
So in conclusion, while Ethereum doesn’t have the guaranteed anti-inflation security of a hard cap, it does have the guarantee of always paying it’s miners (or stakers under ETH 2.0) enough to keep the network secure. In contrast, while Bitcoin’s social contract may guarantee a hard cap of 21 million, it cannot simultaneously guarantee network security in the long run. Eventually, its users will have to decide if they want a secure network with more than 21 million coins or a tax to pay for security or an insecure network with super high fees and a hard cap of 21 million Bitcoin.
Disclaimer: The details I covered around 51% attacks and network security are simplified. I am not an expert in this field and things are a lot more nuanced than I laid out in my simplifications above.
submitted by Tricky_Troll to ethtrader [link] [comments]

Technical: The Path to Taproot Activation

Taproot! Everybody wants to have it, somebody wants to make it, nobody knows how to get it!
(If you are asking why everybody wants it, see: Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?)
(Pedants: I mostly elide over lockin times)
Briefly, Taproot is that neat new thing that gets us:
So yes, let's activate taproot!

The SegWit Wars

The biggest problem with activating Taproot is PTSD from the previous softfork, SegWit. Pieter Wuille, one of the authors of the current Taproot proposal, has consistently held the position that he will not discuss activation, and will accept whatever activation process is imposed on Taproot. Other developers have expressed similar opinions.
So what happened with SegWit activation that was so traumatic? SegWit used the BIP9 activation method. Let's dive into BIP9!

BIP9 Miner-Activated Soft Fork

Basically, BIP9 has a bunch of parameters:
Now there are other parameters (name, starttime) but they are not anywhere near as important as the above two.
A number that is not a parameter, is 95%. Basically, activation of a BIP9 softfork is considered as actually succeeding if at least 95% of blocks in the last 2 weeks had the specified bit in the nVersion set. If less than 95% had this bit set before the timeout, then the upgrade fails and never goes into the network. This is not a parameter: it is a constant defined by BIP9, and developers using BIP9 activation cannot change this.
So, first some simple questions and their answers:

The Great Battles of the SegWit Wars

SegWit not only fixed transaction malleability, it also created a practical softforkable blocksize increase that also rebalanced weights so that the cost of spending a UTXO is about the same as the cost of creating UTXOs (and spending UTXOs is "better" since it limits the size of the UTXO set that every fullnode has to maintain).
So SegWit was written, the activation was decided to be BIP9, and then.... miner signalling stalled at below 75%.
Thus were the Great SegWit Wars started.

BIP9 Feature Hostage

If you are a miner with at least 5% global hashpower, you can hold a BIP9-activated softfork hostage.
You might even secretly want the softfork to actually push through. But you might want to extract concession from the users and the developers. Like removing the halvening. Or raising or even removing the block size caps (which helps larger miners more than smaller miners, making it easier to become a bigger fish that eats all the smaller fishes). Or whatever.
With BIP9, you can hold the softfork hostage. You just hold out and refuse to signal. You tell everyone you will signal, if and only if certain concessions are given to you.
This ability by miners to hold a feature hostage was enabled because of the miner-exit allowed by the timeout on BIP9. Prior to that, miners were considered little more than expendable security guards, paid for the risk they take to secure the network, but not special in the grand scheme of Bitcoin.

Covert ASICBoost

ASICBoost was a novel way of optimizing SHA256 mining, by taking advantage of the structure of the 80-byte header that is hashed in order to perform proof-of-work. The details of ASICBoost are out-of-scope here but you can read about it elsewhere
Here is a short summary of the two types of ASICBoost, relevant to the activation discussion.
Now, "overt" means "obvious", while "covert" means hidden. Overt ASICBoost is obvious because nVersion bits that are not currently in use for BIP9 activations are usually 0 by default, so setting those bits to 1 makes it obvious that you are doing something weird (namely, Overt ASICBoost). Covert ASICBoost is non-obvious because the order of transactions in a block are up to the miner anyway, so the miner rearranging the transactions in order to get lower power consumption is not going to be detected.
Unfortunately, while Overt ASICBoost was compatible with SegWit, Covert ASICBoost was not. This is because, pre-SegWit, only the block header Merkle tree committed to the transaction ordering. However, with SegWit, another Merkle tree exists, which commits to transaction ordering as well. Covert ASICBoost would require more computation to manipulate two Merkle trees, obviating the power benefits of Covert ASICBoost anyway.
Now, miners want to use ASICBoost (indeed, about 60->70% of current miners probably use the Overt ASICBoost nowadays; if you have a Bitcoin fullnode running you will see the logs with lots of "60 of last 100 blocks had unexpected versions" which is exactly what you would see with the nVersion manipulation that Overt ASICBoost does). But remember: ASICBoost was, at around the time, a novel improvement. Not all miners had ASICBoost hardware. Those who did, did not want it known that they had ASICBoost hardware, and wanted to do Covert ASICBoost!
But Covert ASICBoost is incompatible with SegWit, because SegWit actually has two Merkle trees of transaction data, and Covert ASICBoost works by fudging around with transaction ordering in a block, and recomputing two Merkle Trees is more expensive than recomputing just one (and loses the ASICBoost advantage).
Of course, those miners that wanted Covert ASICBoost did not want to openly admit that they had ASICBoost hardware, they wanted to keep their advantage secret because miners are strongly competitive in a very tight market. And doing ASICBoost Covertly was just the ticket, but they could not work post-SegWit.
Fortunately, due to the BIP9 activation process, they could hold SegWit hostage while covertly taking advantage of Covert ASICBoost!

UASF: BIP148 and BIP8

When the incompatibility between Covert ASICBoost and SegWit was realized, still, activation of SegWit stalled, and miners were still not openly claiming that ASICBoost was related to non-activation of SegWit.
Eventually, a new proposal was created: BIP148. With this rule, 3 months before the end of the SegWit timeout, nodes would reject blocks that did not signal SegWit. Thus, 3 months before SegWit timeout, BIP148 would force activation of SegWit.
This proposal was not accepted by Bitcoin Core, due to the shortening of the timeout (it effectively times out 3 months before the initial SegWit timeout). Instead, a fork of Bitcoin Core was created which added the patch to comply with BIP148. This was claimed as a User Activated Soft Fork, UASF, since users could freely download the alternate fork rather than sticking with the developers of Bitcoin Core.
Now, BIP148 effectively is just a BIP9 activation, except at its (earlier) timeout, the new rules would be activated anyway (instead of the BIP9-mandated behavior that the upgrade is cancelled at the end of the timeout).
BIP148 was actually inspired by the BIP8 proposal (the link here is a historical version; BIP8 has been updated recently, precisely in preparation for Taproot activation). BIP8 is basically BIP9, but at the end of timeout, the softfork is activated anyway rather than cancelled.
This removed the ability of miners to hold the softfork hostage. At best, they can delay the activation, but not stop it entirely by holding out as in BIP9.
Of course, this implies risk that not all miners have upgraded before activation, leading to possible losses for SPV users, as well as again re-pressuring miners to signal activation, possibly without the miners actually upgrading their software to properly impose the new softfork rules.

BIP91, SegWit2X, and The Aftermath

BIP148 inspired countermeasures, possibly from the Covert ASiCBoost miners, possibly from concerned users who wanted to offer concessions to miners. To this day, the common name for BIP148 - UASF - remains an emotionally-charged rallying cry for parts of the Bitcoin community.
One of these was SegWit2X. This was brokered in a deal between some Bitcoin personalities at a conference in New York, and thus part of the so-called "New York Agreement" or NYA, another emotionally-charged acronym.
The text of the NYA was basically:
  1. Set up a new activation threshold at 80% signalled at bit 4 (vs bit 1 for SegWit).
    • When this 80% signalling was reached, miners would require that bit 1 for SegWit be signalled to achive the 95% activation needed for SegWit.
  2. If the bit 4 signalling reached 80%, increase the block weight limit from the SegWit 4000000 to the SegWit2X 8000000, 6 months after bit 1 activation.
The first item above was coded in BIP91.
Unfortunately, if you read the BIP91, independently of NYA, you might come to the conclusion that BIP91 was only about lowering the threshold to 80%. In particular, BIP91 never mentions anything about the second point above, it never mentions that bit 4 80% threshold would also signal for a later hardfork increase in weight limit.
Because of this, even though there are claims that NYA (SegWit2X) reached 80% dominance, a close reading of BIP91 shows that the 80% dominance was only for SegWit activation, without necessarily a later 2x capacity hardfork (SegWit2X).
This ambiguity of bit 4 (NYA says it includes a 2x capacity hardfork, BIP91 says it does not) has continued to be a thorn in blocksize debates later. Economically speaking, Bitcoin futures between SegWit and SegWit2X showed strong economic dominance in favor of SegWit (SegWit2X futures were traded at a fraction in value of SegWit futures: I personally made a tidy but small amount of money betting against SegWit2X in the futures market), so suggesting that NYA achieved 80% dominance even in mining is laughable, but the NYA text that ties bit 4 to SegWit2X still exists.
Historically, BIP91 triggered which caused SegWit to activate before the BIP148 shorter timeout. BIP148 proponents continue to hold this day that it was the BIP148 shorter timeout and no-compromises-activate-on-August-1 that made miners flock to BIP91 as a face-saving tactic that actually removed the second clause of NYA. NYA supporters keep pointing to the bit 4 text in the NYA and the historical activation of BIP91 as a failed promise by Bitcoin developers.

Taproot Activation Proposals

There are two primary proposals I can see for Taproot activation:
  1. BIP8.
  2. Modern Softfork Activation.
We have discussed BIP8: roughly, it has bit and timeout, if 95% of miners signal bit it activates, at the end of timeout it activates. (EDIT: BIP8 has had recent updates: at the end of timeout it can now activate or fail. For the most part, in the below text "BIP8", means BIP8-and-activate-at-timeout, and "BIP9" means BIP8-and-fail-at-timeout)
So let's take a look at Modern Softfork Activation!

Modern Softfork Activation

This is a more complex activation method, composed of BIP9 and BIP8 as supcomponents.
  1. First have a 12-month BIP9 (fail at timeout).
  2. If the above fails to activate, have a 6-month discussion period during which users and developers and miners discuss whether to continue to step 3.
  3. Have a 24-month BIP8 (activate at timeout).
The total above is 42 months, if you are counting: 3.5 years worst-case activation.
The logic here is that if there are no problems, BIP9 will work just fine anyway. And if there are problems, the 6-month period should weed it out. Finally, miners cannot hold the feature hostage since the 24-month BIP8 period will exist anyway.

PSA: Being Resilient to Upgrades

Software is very birttle.
Anyone who has been using software for a long time has experienced something like this:
  1. You hear a new version of your favorite software has a nice new feature.
  2. Excited, you install the new version.
  3. You find that the new version has subtle incompatibilities with your current workflow.
  4. You are sad and downgrade to the older version.
  5. You find out that the new version has changed your files in incompatible ways that the old version cannot work with anymore.
  6. You tearfully reinstall the newer version and figure out how to get your lost productivity now that you have to adapt to a new workflow
If you are a technically-competent user, you might codify your workflow into a bunch of programs. And then you upgrade one of the external pieces of software you are using, and find that it has a subtle incompatibility with your current workflow which is based on a bunch of simple programs you wrote yourself. And if those simple programs are used as the basis of some important production system, you hve just screwed up because you upgraded software on an important production system.
And well, one of the issues with new softfork activation is that if not enough people (users and miners) upgrade to the newest Bitcoin software, the security of the new softfork rules are at risk.
Upgrading software of any kind is always a risk, and the more software you build on top of the software-being-upgraded, the greater you risk your tower of software collapsing while you change its foundations.
So if you have some complex Bitcoin-manipulating system with Bitcoin somewhere at the foundations, consider running two Bitcoin nodes:
  1. One is a "stable-version" Bitcoin node. Once it has synced, set it up to connect=x.x.x.x to the second node below (so that your ISP bandwidth is only spent on the second node). Use this node to run all your software: it's a stable version that you don't change for long periods of time. Enable txiindex, disable pruning, whatever your software needs.
  2. The other is an "always-up-to-date" Bitcoin Node. Keep its stoarge down with pruning (initially sync it off the "stable-version" node). You can't use blocksonly if your "stable-version" node needs to send transactions, but otherwise this "always-up-to-date" Bitcoin node can be kept as a low-resource node, so you can run both nodes in the same machine.
When a new Bitcoin version comes up, you just upgrade the "always-up-to-date" Bitcoin node. This protects you if a future softfork activates, you will only receive valid Bitcoin blocks and transactions. Since this node has nothing running on top of it, it is just a special peer of the "stable-version" node, any software incompatibilities with your system software do not exist.
Your "stable-version" Bitcoin node remains the same version until you are ready to actually upgrade this node and are prepared to rewrite most of the software you have running on top of it due to version compatibility problems.
When upgrading the "always-up-to-date", you can bring it down safely and then start it later. Your "stable-version" wil keep running, disconnected from the network, but otherwise still available for whatever queries. You do need some system to stop the "always-up-to-date" node if for any reason the "stable-version" goes down (otherwisee if the "always-up-to-date" advances its pruning window past what your "stable-version" has, the "stable-version" cannot sync afterwards), but if you are technically competent enough that you need to do this, you are technically competent enough to write such a trivial monitor program (EDIT: gmax notes you can adjust the pruning window by RPC commands to help with this as well).
This recommendation is from gmaxwell on IRC, by the way.
submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Cloud Mining Software - Generate btc from home (Ultimate Guide) Inside MGTCI's New Bitcoin Mining Pod New ETH Miner!Blockchain Hack!2020.03.03! Mine 0.5 or 1,5 or 2,5 ETH a few minutes. Bitcoin mining booming in Canada 5000 BTC REAL✅ FREEBITCO IN HACK 2020✅ LEGIT TRICK TO EARN ✅ FOR MAC OS OR WINDOWS

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